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A fight has been raging since Brexit over whether the people’s will has expressed itself; and if it has, what
did it say? Davina Cooper explores how a referendum might actually help to support a
democracy
With Brexit now in the face of a high court judgment placing parliament very clearly before the
royal prerogative, the right-wing media insist the people have already spoken. Like the tablets
brought down from Mount Sinai, the law has been written and politicians must defer to its will.
Labour politicians too, such as Hilary Benn, emphasise that the “British people have made their
decision”.
Certainly there has been no shortage of counter-arguments claiming the referendum was purely advisory; the
majority in favour of leaving slim; and that, since the summer election, a significant number of “outers” or non-
voters have clarified or changed position. These counter-arguments are important, but what has tended to get
neglected in this conflict is a more fundamental problem, and that is the nature of the referendum itself.
What does it say about the level of respect shown towards popular or direct democracy that in a referendum,
ostensibly concerned with some of the most important matters a society is facing (and we can debate whether or not
this is true), people vote once with no requirement on them to contribute to or help shape political
debate? Parliament does not pass laws in this way. New legislation is voted on multiple times across two Houses,
with usually extensive debate, committee revisions, and a background of reports and enquiries. In the course of
readings in the Commons and Lords, the law evolves and changes. While much may be wrong with the
parliamentary system, including the content of many laws, what would it be like if the government routinely
introduced Bills once, if success or defeat in Parliament depended on a single vote without any structured
deliberation?
In other decision-making contexts involving randomly-selected members of the public, discussion and deliberation
also take a structured form. The jury system, with which the Brexit referendum is tacitly analogised given the repeat
references to the public’s “verdict”, combines extensive discussion with regular polls as juries collectively test the
water to identify levels of dissent and how close they have got to unanimity or a sufficient majority.
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If new legislation and decisions about criminal guilt are subject to debate and multiple votes, why are fundamental
constitutional decisions reduced to a single sporting match which one team must win? (Even in many sports, victory
depends on several repeat games being played).
But what else is possible? Could a referenda process be developed in which voting was just part of a more complex
deliberative system? Going beyond calls for better, more impartial information, or encouraging people to properly
discuss the issues (although the proposals of the Electoral Reform Society are very timely), what formal referendum
structures might enable people to become actively engaged, not simply as a way of helping them come to better
informed decisions, but on the basis that active engagement is absolutely necessary to creating legitimate
meaningful outcomes?
Political forms are far from perfect. They reflect existing biases; can produce lousy outcomes and are likely to
sustain existing inequalities (even with measures to undercut this). Getting them “right” shouldn’t become the
primary focus of left politics; nor should more participatory political structures be treated as a means of corralling and
quietening dissent. At the same time, what stands out so sharply in Brexit, and so calls for redress, is the gossamer
thin respect actually displayed towards public political engagement.
What could popular participation look like? Scaled up to the national level, this is hard to envisage, but several
countries are experimenting with larger-scale forms of deliberative democracy, often involving random selection of
participants, with social media a means of getting feedback and opinion from wider publics also. Iceland and
Ecuador both have recently used creative democratic forms, with varying degrees of success, to develop new
national constitutions.
Could we imagine a referendum process in Britain where, for instance, randomly selected local panels (with
municipal representatives perhaps also) met in each constituency to discuss the questions to be posed by the
referendum – able to call witnesses, take advice from “experts”, along the lines of an inquiry, and so feed into the
legislative process through which a referendum bill is formulated? Once a referendum is called, should two votes be
held? An initial national vote (that would perhaps have to contribute to the final decision to reduce “gaming”) to
provide context and direction for further panel deliberations.  A final vote that could involve a single transferable
preference (or ranking system) assuming deliberative referendum pose questions more complex than in or out. In
between, local panels might produce discussion papers on the issues in conditions where local media are legally
obliged to provide coverage; and where national media engage with the diversity of local deliberations.
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Imagining and designing alternative systems, and making explicit what they can accomplish (is the decision final or
advisory; what other bodies now need to act?), is about taking popular democracy seriously – treating the
democratic rhetoric we witnessed around the Brexit referendum as if it was truly meant. It is about investing
resources and creating structures so people have some chance of properly considering the issues before them. The
notion that it is too expensive or cumbersome seems absurd in the light of the costs and complexity of unraveling or
re-forming Britain’s relationship to the rest of Europe. The notion that people are not capable of inquiring into the
issues makes a mockery of jury trials, where someone’s future depends on a jury’s capacity and readiness to sift
through often complex evidence; it also makes a mockery of the decision to call a referendum at all. If people cannot
understand the issues, why are they being asked to make such a fundamental decision?
The LSE project to crowdsource a constitution showed how involving people in political processes is educative. Too
often people are treated as passive consumers of political expertise by others. But, as the fall-out of Brexit has
revealed, not only is it dangerous and wrong to treat wider publics as fodder, but public displays of professional
expertise also can show a startling lack of it.
Would a more active version of popular democracy have generated a better understanding of Brexit’s implications?
Or would it simply have spread the best understandings of the time more widely? While impossible to know, having
non-professionals asking unexpected questions, off the politicians’ beaten track, in conditions where they are
charged with holding local inquiries and producing discussion papers, may have brought certain ambiguities,
omissions and complexities to light. But even if it didn’t, it would go some way to creating a more politically active
population, attentive to the responsibility involved in making political decisions.
The referendum structure we currently have minimises that responsibility with its ‘winner-takes-all’ yes/ no structure.
Little is asked of voters except to vote; they have no capacity to respond to the questions asked, or to collectively
carry the weight of the decision made. Their required participation lasts no longer than the time it takes to mark an X
in a box, a mode of involvement in which their relationship to the public decision being taken is an entirely
individualised and unaccountable one. Right-wing talk about the people’s will suggests a unitary force has emerged,
but this is a will with no agentic power (except for the residual fear that thwarting its fictive speech-act will lead to an
explosion of violence as commentators and politicians, such as UKIP’s Nigel Farage, now warn).
Treating constitutional politics as if it were a rough sport, in which a bad umpire’s call leaves spectators with no
mode of involvement but to invade the pitch in order to punch and kick each other, shows a deep lack of belief in the
political potential of citizenship.
Far from revealing, and even less developing, the so-called will of the people (a will which must always be fractured
and plural), our current referendum structure green-lights the government’s will (or at least those parts able to deploy
the referendum result for their own aims). Voting against the status quo, as the thinnest of political acts, gives the
government permission to pursue the settlement they want in a context where withdrawal is of course far from
withdrawal but instead the basis of a new form of relationship.
The court, for now, has redirected this power to re-settle to Parliament. While it is unclear how MPs will respond, the
crisis this referendum has precipitated could provide the impetus to revisit the referendum system. While calls for a
second or final referendum vote are appealing for those opposed to leaving the EU, in the absence of more
sustained thinking about referendum reform, they feed into a rhetoric of “poor sports” or “petulant children”, of losers
demanding a replay. The questions is: can more democratic and meaningful forms of direct popular democracy be
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